



Early Journal Content on JSTOR, Free to Anyone in the World

This article is one of nearly 500,000 scholarly works digitized and made freely available to everyone in the world by JSTOR.

Known as the Early Journal Content, this set of works include research articles, news, letters, and other writings published in more than 200 of the oldest leading academic journals. The works date from the mid-seventeenth to the early twentieth centuries.

We encourage people to read and share the Early Journal Content openly and to tell others that this resource exists. People may post this content online or redistribute in any way for non-commercial purposes.

Read more about Early Journal Content at <http://about.jstor.org/participate-jstor/individuals/early-journal-content>.

JSTOR is a digital library of academic journals, books, and primary source objects. JSTOR helps people discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content through a powerful research and teaching platform, and preserves this content for future generations. JSTOR is part of ITHAKA, a not-for-profit organization that also includes Ithaka S+R and Portico. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.

NORTH AMERICAN REVIEW

FEBRUARY, 1906.

No DXCI.

IS THE UNITED STATES PREPARED FOR WAR?

BY FREDERIC LOUIS HUIDEKOPER.

WHEN Washington, in a letter to the President of Congress, dated August 20th, 1780, said that "it is an old maxim that the surest way to make a good peace is to be well prepared for war," he merely repeated in another form what had been said by Roman writers many centuries before his time. One need not be a profound student of history to be able to appreciate fully the disasters gratuitously courted by any nation which is not at all times thoroughly prepared for a final appeal to arms, or to comprehend that rampant patriotism and mere numbers of soldiers do not constitute adequate preparations for war; our own Civil War, the Franco-German War and the recent struggle between Japan and Russia are sufficient proofs. The French "Grand Army" of 1805 was one of the most perfect fighting machines that the world has yet seen. Commanded by the greatest strategist of all time, its Marshals a group of warriors whose renown has still to be equalled by any one set of corps commanders, trained by two years of incessant drill at the Armed Camp at Boulogne, imbued with unbounded enthusiasm, it is small wonder that it proved irresistible at Ulm and later at Austerlitz. Napoleon

himself declared that the "Army of Austerlitz" was the finest he ever commanded, and yet one of his aides-de-camp, Count Philippe de Ségur, wrote of it:

"However, these great armies, just like *colossi*, are only good to be seen at a distance from which many of the defective details are imperceptible."

Every great general knows only too well how many imperfections must exist in the best of armies and even under the most favorable circumstances, and it was undoubtedly this knowledge which caused General Sherman to declare:

"I cannot help plead to my countrymen, at every opportunity, to cherish all that is manly and noble in the military profession, because Peace is enervating and no man is wise enough to foretell when soldiers may be in demand again."

We Americans are far too prone to boast that everything we possess is "the finest in the world," and we gloat with a pride often offensive over the marvellous achievements of our national career. Superficiality, which is a dominant American trait, has caused us to slumber under a false security, and to believe that, because we have been fortunate enough to be victorious in our past wars, we may continue to rest at ease over the future. The Monroe Doctrine, with its policy of non-interference in European affairs and its dogma that European Powers shall not meddle in the affairs of this continent, has contributed to give us a provincial standpoint from which even the Spanish-American War and our sudden development into a "World Power" have as yet been unable to deliver us entirely. Animated by the deeply rooted Anglo-Saxon repugnance to a large standing army and anything which smacks of militarism in the slightest degree, we as a people cling with astonishing tenacity to the ridiculous fallacy that a citizen with a musket is fully equal, if not superior, to the trained soldier both in courage and efficiency. That we have thus far weathered the storms which the American Ship of State has encountered seems to us to be ample reason why we should content ourselves with the course that we have steered in the past, utterly oblivious to the fact that we have apparently forgotten the lessons which we ought to have learned, and that in every respect, except as concerns our army, we Americans have never been satisfied to follow, but have striven, and in most cases succeeded in our desire, to lead the rest of the world.

We pride ourselves that we are a peaceful people which does not voluntarily plunge into war; yet our history demonstrates that, since the signing of the Declaration of Independence, for every four and a half years of peace we have had one year of war. The United States has never, thus far, been pitted against the land forces of a first-class military Power: England, although the leading naval Power of the world since the sixteenth century, was not a first-class military Power in 1775-1783, and the blunders of her Sovereign and Cabinet afforded singular aid to the revolting colonies; even in 1812-1815, she had scarcely attained the front rank, and she was, moreover, so involved in her struggle against Napoleon that her Peninsular veterans could not be sent across the ocean until the close of the war, and consequently only participated in the battle of New Orleans which was fought after peace had been signed.

The military establishment of the United States has always consisted of three branches: (1) The Regular Army; (2) The Militia; and (3) The Volunteers. Thanks to the parsimony and short-sightedness of Congress, our Regular Army has invariably been much too small to meet our requirements in time of war—and, indeed, often in time of peace—so that it has always been necessary to depend largely upon the Militia and Volunteers. “Why not?” the opinionated American will reply with characteristic superficiality. “Have we not always had plenty of them at our disposal? And, surely, you cannot ask for better troops than these same Militia and Volunteers were at the close of the Civil War.” Granting that it would be impossible to find in military annals more splendid troops than those which the United States possessed in 1865, we must not forget that they were then militia and volunteers in name only. Four years of desperate fighting had transformed them from extremely raw recruits into seasoned veterans of the very highest type.

We have achieved our phenomenal successes by the application of sound business foresight and judgment and progressive business methods to the various problems which we have undertaken to solve, and it is consequently surprising that our people have not, through their Senators and Representatives in Congress, made use of these same methods in dealing with their Army. It may accordingly be well to examine briefly what our wars have cost us in men and money, and why so little has been learned

from the lessons which the past ought to have taught us. We may begin by scrutinizing the following table:

War.	Regulars.	Militia, etc.	Opponents.	Cost.	Pensions.
Revolution..	231,771 ¹	164,087 ²	Ab't 150,605 ³	\$370,000,000 ⁴	\$70,000,000 ⁵
1812.....	56,032 ⁶	471,622 ⁶	Ab't 55,000 ⁷	82,627,009 ⁸	45,440,790 ⁹
Creek.....	600 ¹⁰	43,921 ¹¹	1,500-2,000 ¹²	Unestimated	See below
Seminole...	5,911 ¹³	1,600 ¹³	Ab't 1,000 ¹⁴	8,004,236 ¹⁵	See below
Bl'k Hawk..	1,341 ¹⁶	4,638 ¹⁶	800-1,000 ¹⁷	5,446,034 ¹⁵	See below
Florida ¹⁸ ...	20,632 ¹⁹	48,152 ²⁰	1,200-2,000 ²¹	69,751,611 ¹⁵	Foot-note ²²
Mexican....	31,024 ²³	73,532 ²⁴	Ab't 46,000 ²⁵	88,500,208 ¹⁵	36,682,848 ²⁶
Civil.....	67,000 ²⁷	2,605,341 ²⁸	1,000,000 ²⁹	5,371,079,748 ³⁰	3,149,537,669 ³¹
Spanish....	58,688 ³²	223,235 ³³	200,000 ³⁴	321,833,254 ³⁵	11,996,198 ³¹
Philippine..	76,416 ³⁶	50,052 ³⁶	Unestimated	171,326,572 ³⁷	

Probably not one American in a hundred thousand has any conception of the outrageous extravagance in men and money that has characterized every war in which we have been involved.

¹ General Emory Upton, "The Military Policy of the United States," p. 58. This was published by the War Department in 1904, and is the most trustworthy work on the subject ever written. Owing to lack of appropriation, it is now out of print.—² Returns and estimates of the Secretary of War; American State Papers, vol. I, pp. 14-19.—³ Original returns in the British Record Office, quoted by H. B. Carrington, "Battles of the American Revolution," pp. 93, 301, 321, 462, 483, 502 and 646.—⁴ Upton, p. 66; Ingersoll, "The Second War," I, p. 14.—⁵ Annual report of the Commissioner of Pensions, Aug. 1st, 1904.—⁶ Records of the Adjutant-General's Office. Also Upton, p. 137.—⁷ Brannan's Letters and Gleig's British Campaigns, quoted by Upton, p. 138. To the above number must be added 1,810 militia and 9,825 Indians.—⁸ Annual report of the Secretary of the Treasury, June 30th, 1905. Also Upton, p. 141.—⁹ Annual report of the Commissioner of Pensions, June 30th, 1905, p. 10.—¹⁰ 39th U. S. Infantry.—¹¹ According to the records of the Adjutant-General's Office, Georgia, Tennessee and Mississippi furnished 25,779 and North and South Carolina 18,142 militia. Of these only 15,000 were actually put into the field.—¹² Upton, p. 119.—¹³ Upton, p. 149. The figures in the first column represent Regulars, Militia and Volunteers; those in the second column represent subsidized Indians.—¹⁴ Report of the Senate Investigating Committee; American State Papers, II, pp. 739-741.—¹⁵ Annual report of the Secretary of the Treasury for 1905, p. 96.—¹⁶ Records of the Adjutant-General's Office.—¹⁷ Report of Major-General Macomb, commanding the Army. American State Papers, V, p. 29.—¹⁸ Including the Florida War, 1835 to 1842; the Creek War, 1836 to 1838; and the Cherokee War, 1836 to 1838.—¹⁹ Upton, p. 190.—²⁰ Records of the Adjutant-General's Office.—²¹ General Call's report to the President, dated Jan. 9th, 1836. American State Papers, VII, p. 218.—²² Annual report of the Commissioner of Pensions, June 30th, 1905, p. 10, gives the total pensions paid out for the Indian Wars as amounting to \$7,637,268.53.—²³ Upton, p. 221.—²⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 216.—²⁵ Alphabetical List of Battles, 1754-1900, pp. 236-237. Compiled from official records by Newton A. Strait.—²⁶ Annual report of the Commissioner of Pensions, June 30th, 1905, pp. 10-11.—

From a purely business standpoint, the above figures are indicative of puerile short-sightedness and criminal blundering, such as would not be tolerated for a moment in any properly managed company or corporation in the United States. One example drawn from Upton will suffice to demonstrate how needlessly extravagant we have been, considering how disproportionately small have been the results achieved:

"The troops called out during this fruitless campaign [1814] numbered: Regulars, 38,186; Militia, 197,653; total, 235,839.

"Of the militia 46,469 from the State of New York were employed on the Canadian frontier, while *more than 100,000 from Pennsylvania, Maryland and Virginia were called out to repel the incursion of the 3,500 British along the shores of the Chesapeake.*

"Notwithstanding these enormous drafts, *such were the faults of our organization and recruitments, that the utmost strength we could put forth on the field of battle was represented at Lundy's Lane by less than 3,000 men.* Nor was this evidence of national weakness our only cause of reproach. *Boasting at the outset of the contest that Canada*

²⁷ Phisterer, Statistical Record of the Armies of the United States (Campaigns of the Civil War Series), p. 11.—²⁸ Official records in the office of the Military Secretary; Memorandum relative to the probable number and ages of Army and Navy survivors of the Civil War, p. 4 (published by the Military Secretary's office, May 15th, 1905); Reply of the Military Secretary, dated Aug. 28th, 1905, to the writer's letter of inquiry. The total number of soldiers, both regular and volunteer, was 2,672,341.—

²⁹ "Battles and Leaders of the Civil War," IV, p. 768. The numbers employed by the Confederacy have been variously estimated from 700,000 to 1,500,000. Livermore, "Numbers and Losses in the Civil War of America," p. 63, reckons the numbers as between 1,227,890 and 1,406,180. These calculations are at best conjectural, since, as the Military Secretary wrote, on August 28th, 1905, to the author of this article: "No compilation has ever been prepared by this [the War] Department from which even an approximately accurate statement can be made concerning the number of troops in the Confederate Army, and it is impracticable to make such a compilation because of the incompleteness of the collection of Confederate records in possession of the Department."—³⁰ Senate Executive Document No. 206, Forty-sixth Congress, Second Session. Letter of John Sherman, Secretary of the Treasury, to Hon. William A. Wheeler, President of the Senate, 1880, transmitting the statement of "Expenditures necessarily growing out of the War of the Rebellion, July 1st, 1816, to June 30th, 1879," a total of not less than \$6,189,929,908.58.—

³¹ Report of the Commissioner of Pensions for 1905, pp. 10 and 11.—³² Report of the Adjutant-General, Nov. 1st, 1898, in the report of the Secretary of War for 1898, pp. 145, 147 and 260.—³³ Statistical Exhibit of Strength of Volunteer Forces called into service during the War with Spain, issued by the Adjutant-General, Dec. 13th, 1899. Also Strait, pp. 208-209.—³⁴ International Year Book for 1898, p. 722; Lodge, "History of the War with Spain," p. 18.—³⁵ Report of the Secretary of the Treasury for 1905, p. 98.—³⁶ Report of the Adjutant-General, Nov. 1st, 1898.—

³⁷ From May, 1898, to April, 1902, both inclusive, according to the statement sent to the Senate by the Secretary of War, June 19th, 1902.

could be 'captured without soldiers, and that a few volunteers and militia could do the business,' our statesmen, after nearly three years of war, had the humiliation of seeing their plan of conquest vanish in the smoke of a burning capital."

The lamentable policy of retrenchment in time of peace, to which our legislators have invariably adhered, is nothing less than the "penny wise, pound foolish" policy which every sane business man heartily condemns. The results entailed by this false economy furnish a further corroboration of the fact that our military policy has always been unsound from a financial as well as a numerical standpoint, as will appear from the following table:

COST OF U. S. MILITARY ESTABLISHMENT BY PERIODS

Period.	Condition.	Cost.
1791-1811 ¹	Peace.....	\$35,669,930 65
1812-1816	Including the War of 1812.....	82,627,009 14
1817-1835	Minor Indian Wars. Army averaging under 6,000 officers and men.....	90,411,068 59
1836-1843	Florida War.....	69,751,611 50
1843-1845	Peace. Army reduced.....	13,873,146 89
1846-1849	Including the Mexican War.....	88,500,208 38
1850-1860	Peace. Army reduced.....	168,079,707 57
1861-1865	Including the Civil War.....	2,736,570,923 50
1866-1869	Forces large, because of French occupation of Mexico.....	583,749,510 99 ²
1870-1897	Peace. Army reduced.....	1,211,321,300 94
1898-1899	Including Spanish-American War.....	321,833,254 76
1900-1902	Including Philippine War.....	391,662,681 06
1903-1905	Peace.....	355,830,004 97
Total cost since 1790.....		\$6,149,880,358 94 ³
Total cost of pensions since 1790.....		\$3,359,185,901 02 ³

What do American taxpayers who have had to foot some of these bills think of these figures? How long do they suppose that the stockholders in any bank or railway company would tolerate any such mismanagement? How long would the officials or directors be permitted to remain in power if they could produce no better results in return for such enormous expenditures? The mere expense of maintaining armaments, however costly, is by no means the only item to be considered in war; the outpouring of men to meet the call to arms, the disturbance of all business, economic and political conditions are additional factors which must not be disregarded. When one considers that sacrifices involving pecuniary loss to every individual have always

¹ Throughout this table the dates given are "both inclusive" in each instance.—² Including outstanding warrants amounting to \$3,621,780.07.—

³ Annual report of the Secretary of the Treasury for 1905, pp. 96 and 98.

been willingly met, and that our military forces have nearly always been disgracefully beaten at the beginning of every war, save one, it is indeed a veritable enigma that the nation has not long ago awakened to the mismanagement of its affairs and risen in anger against the indignities to which it has been subjected by its own servants.

It may be worth while to examine briefly the military history of the United States, taking care, as Upton warns us,

“to bear in mind the respective duties and responsibilities of soldiers and statesmen. The latter are responsible for the creation and organization of our resources, and, as in the case of the President, may further be responsible for their management or mismanagement. Soldiers, while they should suggest and be consulted on all the details of organization under our system, can alone be held responsible for the control and direction of our armies in the field.”

In a speech made to both Houses of Congress on December 3rd, 1793, Washington said:

“I cannot recommend to your notice measures for the fulfilment of our duties to the rest of the world without again pressing upon you the necessity of placing ourselves in a condition of complete defence, and of exacting from them the fulfilment of their duties towards us. The United States ought not to indulge a persuasion that, contrary to the order of human events, they will forever keep at a distance those painful appeals to arms with which the history of every other nation abounds. *There is a rank due to these United States among nations which will be withheld, if not absolutely lost, by the reputation of weakness. If we desire to avoid insult, we must be able to repel it; if we desire to secure peace, one of the most powerful instruments of our rising prosperity, it must be known that we are at all times ready for war.*”

This dictum is applicable with equal force to every nation and every era. Why did the United States not attain the front rank among the nations of the world until the autumn of 1898? There is only one answer: because at no time in its national career, except at the end of the Civil War, was it capable of showing itself fully prepared to repel insult by force of arms at a moment's notice.

The errors committed during the Revolutionary War are thus vividly told in a letter written on August 20th, 1780, by Washington to the President of Congress:

“To one who has been a witness of the evils brought upon us by short enlistments, the system appears to have been pernicious beyond descrip-

tion, and a crowd of motives press themselves to dictate a change. It may easily be shown that all the misfortunes we have met with in the military line are to be attributed to this cause.

“Had we formed a permanent army in the beginning, which, by the continuance of the same men in service, had been capable of discipline, we never should have had to retreat with a handful of men across the Delaware in 1776, trembling for the fate of America, which nothing but the infatuation of the enemy could have saved; we should not have remained all the succeeding winter at their mercy, with sometimes scarcely a sufficient body of men to mount the ordinary guards, liable at every moment to be dissipated, if they had only thought proper to march against us; we should not have been under the necessity of fighting Brandywine, with an unequal number of raw troops, and afterwards of seeing Philadelphia fall a prey to a victorious army; we should not have been at Valley Forge with less than half the force of the enemy, destitute of everything, in a situation neither to resist nor to retire; we should not have seen New York left with a handful of men, yet an overmatch for the main army of these States, while the principal part of their force was detached for the reduction of two of them; we should not have found ourselves this spring so weak as to be insulted by 5,000 men, unable to protect our baggage and magazines, their security depending on a good countenance and a want of enterprise in the enemy; we should not have been, the greatest part of the war, inferior to the enemy, indebted for our safety to their inactivity, enduring frequently the mortification of seeing inviting opportunities to ruin them pass unimproved for want of a force which the country was completely able to afford, and of seeing the country ravaged, our towns burnt, the inhabitants plundered, abused, murdered, with impunity from the same cause.

“Nor have the ill effects been confined to the military line. A great part of the embarrassments in the civil departments flow from the same source. The derangement of our finances is essentially to be ascribed to it. The expense of the war and the paper emissions have been greatly multiplied by it. We have had a great part of the time two sets of men to feed and pay—the discharged men going home, and the levies coming in. This was more remarkably the case in 1775 and 1776. The difficulty and cost of engaging men have increased at every successive attempt, till among the present lines we find that there are some who have received \$150 in specie for five months’ service, while our officers are reduced to the disagreeable necessity of performing the duties of drill sergeants to them, with this mortifying reflection annexed to the business, that, by the time they have taught these men the rudiments of a soldier’s duty, their services will have expired and the work recommenced with a new set. The consumption of provisions, arms, accoutrements and stores of every kind has been doubled in spite of every precaution I could use, not only from the cause just mentioned, but from the carelessness and licentiousness incident to militia and irregular troops. Our discipline also has been much hurt, if not ruined, by such constant changes. The frequent calls upon the militia have interrupted the cultivation

of the land, and of course have lessened the quantity of its produce, occasioned a scarcity, and enhanced the prices. In an army so unstable as ours, order and economy have been impracticable. No person who has been a close observer of the progress of our affairs can doubt that our currency has depreciated without comparison more rapidly from the system of short enlistments than it would have done otherwise.

"There is every reason to believe that the war has been protracted on this account. Our opposition being less, the successes of the enemy have been greater. The fluctuation of the army kept alive their hopes, and at every period of the dissolution of a considerable part of it they have flattered themselves with some decisive advantages. *Had we kept a permanent army on foot the enemy could have had nothing to hope for, and would in all probability have listened to terms long since.*

"If the army is left in the present situation, it must continue an encouragement to the efforts of the enemy; if it is put upon a respectable one, it must have a contrary effect, and nothing, I believe, will tend more to give us peace the coming winter. Many circumstances will contribute to a negotiation. An army on foot not only for another campaign, but for several campaigns, would determine the enemy to pacific measures, and enable us to insist upon favorable terms in forceable language; an army insignificant in numbers, dissatisfied and crumbling to pieces, would be the strongest temptation they could have to try the experiment a little longer. It is an old maxim, that *the surest way to make a good peace is to be well prepared for war.*"

From a military point of view the errors of the Revolutionary War may be summed up under ten headings, viz.:

- (1) Enlisting of volunteers for too short periods of service; (2) entirely too great a dependence placed upon the militia; (3) substituting or increasing the armies in the field by new and untrained organizations, instead of keeping the former up to their full strength; (4) pernicious use of bounties, both State and National—the logical result of short enlistments and dearth of proper provisions for recruiting; (5) depriving organizations of their officers by detailing them on detached duty, owing to the failure to provide the requisite number of officers for staff duty, recruiting, etc.; (6) final expedient of drafting troops; (7) enormously increased expense caused by the unnecessarily large number of troops under pay, the wanton waste resulting from lack of discipline and the heavy losses from sickness which is inevitable among raw troops; (8) needless protraction of the war, owing to the inefficiency of the troops employed; (9) absolute lack of definite policy by Congress at any time during the war—consequent inability of the commander-in-chief to frame any sound plan of campaign, and the necessity of resorting to inadequate and costly makeshifts; and (10) unnecessary increase in the pension list.

Let us now examine briefly the laws enacted by our sage legislators, and see how much profit they have derived from these awful lessons which so nearly lost us our independence.

In the midst of the most critical period in the history of the United States, when the national credit at home and abroad was completely exhausted, and when the country was rapidly drifting into a state of anarchy, Congress on June 2nd, 1784, resolved:

“That the commanding officer be, and he is hereby, directed to discharge the troops now in the service of the United States, *except twenty-five privates* to guard the stores at Fort Pitt and *fifty-five* to guard the stores at West Point, and other magazines, *with a proportionate number of officers*; no officer to remain in service above the rank of captain, and those privates to be retained who were enlisted on the best terms: *Provided*, That Congress before its recess shall not take other measures respecting the disposition of those troops.”

On the very next day, totally ignoring the disasters occasioned by employing raw levies during the Revolution, Congress passed the following measure:

“Whereas a body of troops to consist of 700 non-commissioned officers and privates, properly officered, are immediately and indispensably necessary for securing and protecting the Northwestern frontiers of the United States, and their Indian friends and allies, and for garrisoning the posts soon to be evacuated by the troops of His Britannic Majesty:

“*Resolved*, That it be, and it is hereby, recommended to the States hereafter named, and as most conveniently situated, to furnish forthwith from their militia 700 men, to serve for twelve months unless sooner discharged, in the following proportions: Connecticut, 165; New York, 165; New Jersey, 110; Pennsylvania, 260; making in the whole 700:

“*Resolved*, That the Secretary of War take order for forming the said troops when assembled into one regiment to consist of eight companies of infantry and two of artillery, arming and equipping them in a soldierlike manner.”

Within a year, Congress awoke to the realization that these militia were totally inadequate, and that regular troops were indispensable; accordingly, on April 1st, 1785, it resolved:

“That it is necessary that a body of troops consisting of 700 non-commissioned officers and privates be raised for the term of three years,

unless sooner discharged, for the protection of the Northwestern frontiers, to defend the settlers on the land belonging to the United States from the depredations of the Indians and to prevent unwarranted intrusion thereon, and for guarding the public stores."

On April 7th and 12th, supplemental legislation was enacted, specifying the States which were to furnish the recruits and defining the organization of this first regular regiment of the United States Army (the present 3rd Infantry).

Shay's rebellion (December, 1786) which seriously imperilled the Government arsenal at Springfield, Mass., coupled with a desire to "save the great expense of transporting new levies to the distant frontiers" and "to avail the public of the discipline and knowledge of the country" acquired by the Regulars raised in 1785, caused Congress to offer inducements to the men to reenlist by voting, on October 3rd, 1787, "that seven hundred non-commissioned officers and privates be raised for the term of three years, unless sooner discharged."

In consequence of the adoption and ratification of the Constitution, the military as well as the civil affairs required overhauling, and a War Department was created by the law of August 7th, 1789. The Act of September 29th laid the foundations of our present Army by recognizing "the establishment for the troops in the service of the United States," by requiring all officers and men to take an oath of allegiance, and by vesting the power to appoint officers in the President alone. By virtue of the 5th section the President was authorized, whenever it might be necessary to protect the frontiers against the Indians, to call into service such militia as he should deem requisite, such militia when in service to have the same pay and subsistence as the Regulars.

The first general organization of the Army under the Constitution was effected by the Act of April 30th, 1790, which fixed the strength of the regular establishment at one regiment of infantry and one battalion of artillery, numbering respectively 962 and 321 officers and men. General Harmar's expedition against the Miamis again demonstrated the folly of depending upon newly formed militia, and forced Congress to add another regiment of Regulars to be enlisted for three years. By virtue of the 8th section of this Act of March 3rd, 1791, the President was empowered to employ, "for a term not exceeding six months,"

a corps of 2,000 non-commissioned officers, privates and musicians in addition to, or in place of, the militia, and, if such a corps should not be raised in time for active operations, to make good the deficiency by raising additional levies or by calling into service an equal number of militia; while the 9th section authorized him "to organize the said levies, and alone to appoint the commissioned officers thereof, in the manner he may judge proper." As Upton remarks:

"The above legislation merits our closest scrutiny. Here was laid the foundation of the volunteer system, which attained its fullest development during our long Civil War. The 'levies,' known later as 'volunteers,' were authorized under the plenary power of Congress to 'raise and support armies,' and the power of appointing their officers was given the President, to whom it obviously belonged, as the 'levies' were wholly distinct from the militia or State troops.

"The subsequent transfer of this power from the President to the Governors of the States was a voluntary return to the practice under the Confederation and a surrender of the prerogatives of the General Government under the Constitution."

The disastrous rout of General St. Clair's expedition by the Indians caused Congress to increase the strength of the Army to 258 officers and 5,414 men, by the Act of March 5th, 1792. For the succeeding twenty years the legislative enactments, depending largely upon our foreign relations and upon the troubles with the Indians, caused the force of the Regular Army to vary greatly, as will be seen from the following table:

STRENGTH OF THE REGULAR ARMY AS AUTHORIZED BY CONGRESS.¹

Date.	Officers.	Men.	Total.
1796 to 1798.....	233	3,126	3,359
1798.....	783	13,638	14,421
1799.....	2,447	49,244	51,691
1800 to 1801.....	318	4,118	4,436
1802 to 1808.....	241	3,046	3,287
1808 to 1812.....	774	9,147	9,921

During this entire period, by far the most important measure was the Act of March 16th, 1802, in which the repeated urgings of Washington, Hamilton, Knox and Pickering were heeded by the establishment of a Military Academy at West Point; and only

¹ F. B. Heitman, "Historical Register and Dictionary of the United States Army, 1789 to 1903," II, p. 626. This work was compiled from official sources. The actual strength of the Army was naturally always less than the authorized strength.

second in importance to the above law, was the Act of March 2nd, 1799, the provisions of which would unquestionably have prevented most of our subsequent disasters had they only been retained in force. From 1802 to 1808, all Congressional measures, whether offensive or defensive, were directed toward the almost exclusive use of the militia and volunteers. Notwithstanding that a quarrel with England had been brewing since 1807, and by 1810 was recognized to be unavoidable, Congress was so culpably negligent of the urgent needs of the nation for additional protection that, in July, 1812, the Army did not actually exceed 6,686 officers and men, short enlistments were again resorted to and the outbreak of war found the entire military establishment in the utmost chaos. The fruits of the vicious military policy which had been so persistently followed by Congress were reaped in a succession of failures, defeats and disgraces, culminating with the burning of Washington, which are still an indelible blot upon our national history, and few of us realize that, in spite of our employment of nearly half a million militia and volunteers, "*the only decisive victory of the War of 1812 before the conclusion of the treaty of peace was at the battle of the Thames, where the force of the British regulars dispersed and captured numbered but little more than 800.*"

In 1814, the Army numbered on paper 62,674 officers and men, whereas its actual strength in September of that year was only 38,186, and the succession of disasters caused desertion to such an extent that by February, 1815, it had dwindled to 33,424. At the close of the war, the policy of retrenchment was again resorted to, and by the Act of March 3rd, 1815, the Army was reduced to 10,024. The Act of April 24th, 1816, important as it was in many respects, did not affect the strength of the Army which fell off until it reached a minimum of 5,211 in 1822, by virtue of the Act of March 2nd, 1821, which reduced its paper strength of 12,664 to 6,183. The actual force of Regulars did not vary 2,000 from that number for seventeen years until the complications with Great Britain caused Congress to increase it to 12,539 by the Acts of July 5th and 7th, 1838, although the maximum actual strength of 11,169 was not attained until November, 1841. On August 23rd, 1842, only nine days after the official announcement of the termination of hostilities in the Florida War, Congress lost no time in reducing the Army to 8,613, which

constituted approximately its strength until the outbreak of the Mexican War on May 11th, 1846. Within the next ten months and by virtue of seven Acts of Congress, the military establishment was increased on paper to 30,865—although its actual numbers in November, 1847, did not exceed 21,686; but the very month after the ratification of the treaty of peace had been proclaimed, it was forthwith reduced to 10,317 (Act of August 14th, 1848), remaining within 1,000 of this number until November, 1854. The hostility of the Indians caused the President to avail himself of the authority given him by the Act of June 17th, 1850, and to order the companies west of the Mississippi to be recruited up to their full complement; this order, in conjunction with the Act of March 3rd, 1855, gave the Army an actual force of 15,752 officers and men, from which it did not vary 1,800 until the outbreak of the Civil War.

Throughout the entire period from 1802 to 1860 and notwithstanding the lessons of the Revolution, which each succeeding war demonstrated anew, Congress persisted, whenever hostilities were imminent or larger forces than the Regular Army were required, in confiding the destinies of the nation to a hurriedly collected militia, which, by the very nature of its composition and lack of training, was utterly unfit to cope with the situation. Added to the lack of a sound military policy displayed by our legislators in adhering to short enlistments, in increasing the armies in the field by raw organizations, in the use of bounties and in repeating all the mistakes made during the War of Independence, the incapacity of the militia obliged the Government to employ many times the number which would have amply sufficed had trained soldiers been used, needlessly prolonged wars that could have been terminated much sooner and caused expenditures which the magnitude of the operations never once justified. The Mexican War alone added real lustre to the American arms; and this may be reasonably attributed to the fact that circumstances permitted enough time to be gained at the beginning of the war to give the volunteers some much-needed training, and that the Government was wise enough to employ a larger percentage (30 per cent.) of Regular troops than in any war before or since. The value of trained forces is evinced by the fact that they achieved an unbroken chain of victories, notwithstanding that official documents prove that their suc-

cesses were won "under the very same system of laws and executive orders which, in the preceding foreign war (1812), had led to a series of disasters culminating in the capture and destruction of our capital."

How little heed had been paid by Congress to the lessons of the past has been thus admirably summarized by Upton:

"At the close of the year 1860, we presented to the world the spectacle of a great nation nearly destitute of military force. Our territory from ocean to ocean exceeded 3,000,000 square miles; our population numbered 31,000,000.

"The Regular Army, as organized, consisted of 18,093 officers and men, but according to the returns it numbered only 16,367.

"The line of the Army was composed of 198 companies, of which 183 were stationed on the frontier or were en route to distant posts west of the Mississippi. The remaining 15 companies were stationed along the Canadian frontier and on the Atlantic coast from Maine to the Gulf of Mexico.

"As a guard for the national frontiers, the Army could not furnish two soldiers per mile; for protecting the settlements in the States and Territories west of the Mississippi but one soldier was available for every 120 square miles; to aid in the enforcement of the laws in the remaining States of the Union we had but one soldier for every 1,300 square miles.

"The militia for a sudden emergency were scarcely more available than the Army. Nominally they numbered more than 3,000,000, but mostly unorganized. So destitute were they of instruction and training that—a few regiments in the large cities excepted—they did not merit the name of military force.

"Such was the condition of the national defence when, on the 20th of December, 1860, South Carolina in convention passed the ordinance of secession."

It is beyond the scope of this article to describe *in extenso* all the errors committed during the Civil War. Suffice it to say that, for want of a Regular Army of sufficient size and expansiveness, or a proper force of trained militia capable of crushing the Confederacy at its inception, recourse had to be had to raw troops, in which the President and his Cabinet showed at the outset the same blind confidence which their predecessors had manifested in 1812. The logical result followed; these undisciplined volunteers ran away in a most disgraceful manner at the first battle of Bull Run, and the opening year of the war was marked by an almost unbroken chain of disasters, in spite of the fact that the Government called out no less than 807,557

troops—669,243 of which responded—at a cost of more than \$238,000,000. Oblivious to the lessons of preceding wars, the folly of short enlistments was again committed, the Constitution had to be violated in order to meet the sudden emergency, the armies in the field were reinforced by new and untrained regiments, which, through ignorance and lack of discipline, suffered from unnecessary sickness, causing at the same time criminal waste and expense. Large bounties and even forced drafting had to be resorted to within two years and, lastly, no definite military policy worthy of the name was followed until General Grant was appointed Commander-in-Chief. In a word, all the errors of the Revolution were repeated *ad nauseam*. Blunder after blunder was committed by volunteer officers whose ignorance was only excelled by their courage, yet Congress never permitted the Regular Army to be increased beyond a paper strength of 39,273 officers and men (Acts of July 29th and August 3rd, 1861). This dearth of properly trained soldiers at the beginning of hostilities caused the war to be needlessly prolonged for four years; and, indeed, it is highly doubtful if it would have been brought to a successful termination even then had it not been for the iron circle of blockade which the Navy drew around the coasts of the Confederacy. At the close of the war, the volunteers had acquired a training which made them comparable to any armies that have ever existed, but at what an awful cost; more than 2,600,000 had had to be called into service, the United States Government spent no less than \$5,775,910,672.78, and the pensions paid out for this war alone have amounted to the fabulous sum of \$3,149,537,669.52. On March 31st, 1862—nearly one year after the outbreak of the war—the United States had in service an army of 637,126 regulars and volunteers, whereas the Confederacy possessed only 200,000 and nevertheless was unsubdued. The difference between the respective policies has been thus admirably epitomized by Upton:

“The Government sought to save the Union by fighting as a Confederacy; the Confederates sought to destroy it by fighting as a nation. The Government recognized the States, appealed to them for troops, adhered to voluntary enlistments, gave the Governors power to appoint all commissioned officers and encouraged them to organize new regiments. The Confederates abandoned State sovereignty, appealed directly to the people, took away from them the power to appoint com-

missioned officers, vested their appointment in the Confederate President, refused to organize war regiments, abandoned voluntary enlistments, and, adopting the republican principle that every citizen owes his country military service, called into the army every white man between the ages of 18 and 35."

When the Confederacy was at last crushed and the great armies of veteran volunteers had been disbanded, the disturbed condition of the South and the violation of the Monroe Doctrine by the French invasion of Mexico compelled Congress to increase the Regular Army to 54,641 by the Act of July 28th, 1866; but, three years later, when the French Government had withdrawn its forces, the Army was reduced to 37,313 by the Act of March 3rd, 1869. A succession of Acts, culminating in that of June 26th, 1876, effected a further reduction to 27,472 officers and men, the maximum of enlisted men being definitely fixed at 25,000 by the Act of June 16th, 1874. For the following twenty-two years, the actual strength of the military establishment never exceeded 28,000, until the Act of March 8th, 1898, added two regiments of artillery, thus bringing its number up to 28,747 on paper. In spite of all the lessons of the past, we have seen, as Captain Rhodes points out in his admirable Gold Medal Prize Essay of the Military Service Institution for 1904, that:

"The war with Spain, declared from the 21st of April, 1898, found us with the smallest Regular Army, in proportion to population, that we have had at the beginning of any of our wars. It consisted of but 2,143 officers and 26,040 enlisted men, *or less than four-tenths of one per cent. of our estimated population.*"

Although Congress, by the Act of April 26th, 1898, authorized an increase of the Regular Army to 64,719, the actual operations necessarily began much too soon to permit this augmentation to be effected in time to meet the emergency; and, as usual, recourse was had to the militia, from which 200,000 volunteers were called out by the President's proclamations of April 22nd and May 25th. As Captain Rhodes tells us:

"A not unexpected deduction from our experiences in the Mexican and Civil Wars was that the efficiency of American volunteers was to be measured by the previous training, professional zeal and soldierly discipline of their officers. The enlisted personnel has ever been of splen-

did natural quality, and has not varied considerably in different regiments. Trained officers have by no means been numerous.

"The Spanish War was no exception in this respect, because the same obsolete system of selection of officers was followed as in former wars, and naturally the same results followed."

The events of this war are still too vivid in the minds of all of us to require chronicling here. Congress, as usual, failed to provide the necessary supplies until the very eve of mobilization and concentration, so that some of the volunteer regiments reported for duty without arms, accoutrements, ammunition or clothing. The confusion in the various camps, the dearth of proper supplies and equipment, the lack of adequate means of transport, the wild chaos at Tampa, the criminal waste of provisions which could not be found, the bungling which marked the embarking at Tampa and the landing at Daiquiri and Siboney, the blundering conduct of the operations culminating at Santiago and the wholly unnecessary sufferings of the troops by reason of their ignorance, coupled with the paucity of medical stores, field and base hospitals, afford a spectacle of unpreparedness and incapacity of which we Americans ought to be heartily ashamed. Judged by a purely military standard, the invasion of Cuba was a trivial affair; but never in modern times has there been an expedition which contained so many elements of weakness; that it succeeded at all is, indeed, a marvel. *The disorders, demoralization and incapacity which attended the opening operations were nothing but the logical outcome of the unwillingness of Congress to prepare for war until the last possible moment, and merely demonstrated once again the utterly vicious system to which our legislators have persistently bound us, by neglecting to provide a force of thoroughly trained soldiers either large enough or elastic enough to meet the requirements of war as well as of peace, supported by a militia which has previously had sufficient training to make it, when called out as volunteers, fairly dependable against the regular forces of other nations.*

FREDERIC LOUIS HUIDEKOPER.

(To be Continued.)